Arbeitspapier
Public goods, social norms and naive beliefs
An individual's contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naive and biased towards taking things at face value. We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naive inferences.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper ; No. 08,07
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Public Goods
- Subject
-
signalling
naive beliefs
public goods
Soziale Werte
Altruismus
Öffentliches Gut
Signalling
Theorie
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Cartwright, Edward
Patel, Amrish
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
University of Kent, Department of Economics
- (where)
-
Canterbury
- (when)
-
2008
- Handle
- Last update
- 10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Cartwright, Edward
- Patel, Amrish
- University of Kent, Department of Economics
Time of origin
- 2008
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