Social preferences, beliefs and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments

Arbeitspapier

One lingering puzzle is why voluntary contributions to public goods decline over time in experimental and real-world settings. We show that the decline of cooperation is driven by individual preferences for imperfect conditional cooperation. Many people's desire to contribute less than others, rather than changing beliefs of what others will contribute over time or people's heterogeneity in preferences makes voluntary cooperation fragile. Universal free riding thus eventually emerges, despite the fact that most people are not selfish.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CeDEx Discussion Paper Series ; No. 2009-04

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Noncooperative Games ; Public Goods ; Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
• Subject: public goods experiments ; social preferences ; conditional cooperation ; free riding ; Trittbrettfahrerverhalten ; Öffentliches Gut ; Test ; Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion ; Kooperation ; Theorie

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Fischbacher, Urs ; Gächter, Simon
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx)
• (where): Nottingham
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49704
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET