Arbeitspapier
The effect of signalling and beliefs on the voluntary provision of public goods
We report and analyze the results of a series of classroom experiments on the voluntary provision of public goods. Using fixed effect panel regression models we find that cooperation significantly increases when participants are forced to guess the degree of overall cooperation. We also find that the possibility to make announcements during the experiment enhances cooperation significantly although these commitments are not binding and heavily used for cheating purposes. We suggest that this effect is due to attempts at restoring the announcements' reputation in the aftermath of heavy cheating.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 10/03
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Expectations; Speculations
- Thema
-
Experimental Economics
Public Goods
Cheap Talk
Signalling
Communication
Expectations
Öffentliches Gut
Public Choice
Spieltheorie
Signalling
Kommunikation
Test
Erwartungstheorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Berlemann, Michael
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Technische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften
- (wo)
-
Dresden
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Berlemann, Michael
- Technische Universität Dresden, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften
Entstanden
- 2003