Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game

Arbeitspapier

In a two-person ¯nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speci¯cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship to identify the player's most likely preference \type. Our estimation analysis indicates that players are heterogeneous in their preferences also at the intentional level. Moreover, our data show that deviations from intended actions are positively related to changes in beliefs, thereby suggesting that people are able to plan.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Jena Economic Research Papers ; No. 2007,104

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Group Behavior ; Public Goods
• Subject: Public goods games ; Experiments ; Latent-class logit ; Conditional cooperation ; Öffentliches Gut ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Kooperation ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): González, Luis G. ; Levati, Maria Vittoria
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics
• (where): Jena
• (when): 2007

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/25683
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET