Artikel

Incentive-compatible voting rules with positively correlated beliefs

We study the consequences of positive correlation of beliefs in the design of voting rules in a model with an arbitrary number of voters. We propose a notion of positive correlation, based on the likelihood of agreement of the k best alternatives (for any k) of two orders called TS correlation. We characterize the set of Ordinally Bayesian Incentive-Compatible (OBIC) (d'Aspremont and Peleg (1988)) voting rules with TS-correlated beliefs and additionally satisfying robustness with respect to local perturbations. We provide an example of a voting rule that satisfies OBIC with respect to all TS-correlated beliefs. The generally positive results contrast sharply with the negative results obtained for the independent case by Majumdar and Sen (2004) and parallel similar results in the auction design model (Cremer anf McLean (1988)).

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Journal: Theoretical Economics ; ISSN: 1555-7561 ; Volume: 10 ; Year: 2015 ; Issue: 3 ; Pages: 867-885 ; New Haven, CT: The Econometric Society

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
Subject
Voting rules
ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility
positive correlation
robustness with respect to beliefs

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Sen, Arunava
Bhargava, Mohit
Majumdar, Dipjyoti
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
The Econometric Society
(where)
New Haven, CT
(when)
2015

DOI
doi:10.3982/TE1529
Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Artikel

Associated

  • Sen, Arunava
  • Bhargava, Mohit
  • Majumdar, Dipjyoti
  • The Econometric Society

Time of origin

  • 2015

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