Transfer pricing or formula apportionment? : tax induced distortions of multinationals' investment and production decisions
- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Disskussionsbeitrag / Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre ; Diskussionsbeitr. Nr. 27
- Keyword
-
Doppelbesteuerung
Pretiale Lenkung
Verrechnungspreis
Organschaft
Steuerwirkung
Multinationales Unternehmen
Auslandsinvestition
Besteuerungsprinzip
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-20091020903
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:49 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Martini, Jan T.
- Arqus
Time of origin
- 2007
Other Objects (12)
Transfer pricing or formula apportionment? Tax-induced distortions of multinationals' investment and production decisions
Transfer pricing or formula apportionment?: tax-induced distortions of multinationals' investment and production decisions
Formula apportionment or separate accounting? Tax-induced distortions of multinationals' locational investment decisions
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition.
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition
The choice of apportionment factors under formula apportionment
Strategic consolidation under formula apportionment
Management incentives under formula apportionment – Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting –
Management incentives under formula apportionment: Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting
Management Incentives under Formula Apportionment - Tax-Induced Distortions of Effort and Compensation in a Principal-Agent Setting -
Asymmetric Tax Competition with Formula Apportionment
Transfer pricing or formula apportionment? Tax-induced distortions of multinationals' investment and production decisions
Transfer pricing or formula apportionment?: tax-induced distortions of multinationals' investment and production decisions
Formula apportionment or separate accounting? Tax-induced distortions of multinationals' locational investment decisions
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition.
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition
The choice of apportionment factors under formula apportionment
Strategic consolidation under formula apportionment
Management incentives under formula apportionment – Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting –
Management incentives under formula apportionment: Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting
Management Incentives under Formula Apportionment - Tax-Induced Distortions of Effort and Compensation in a Principal-Agent Setting -
Asymmetric Tax Competition with Formula Apportionment
Transfer pricing or formula apportionment? Tax-induced distortions of multinationals' investment and production decisions
Transfer pricing or formula apportionment?: tax-induced distortions of multinationals' investment and production decisions
Formula apportionment or separate accounting? Tax-induced distortions of multinationals' locational investment decisions
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition.
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition
The choice of apportionment factors under formula apportionment
Strategic consolidation under formula apportionment
Management incentives under formula apportionment – Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting –
Management incentives under formula apportionment: Tax-induced distortions of effort and compensation in a principal-agent setting
Management Incentives under Formula Apportionment - Tax-Induced Distortions of Effort and Compensation in a Principal-Agent Setting -