Arbeitspapier

Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition

This paper demonstrates that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic) competition, a transition from separate accounting (SA) to formula apportionment (FA) does not eliminate the problem of profit shifting via transfer pricing. In particular, if affiliates of a multinational firm face oligopolistic competition, it is beneficial for the multinational to manipulate transfer prices for tax-saving as well as strategic reasons under both FA and SA. The analysis shows that a switch from SA rules to FA rules may actually strengthen profit shifting activities by multinationals.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 491

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Nielsen, Søren Bo
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
Schjelderup, Guttorm
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2001

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Nielsen, Søren Bo
  • Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
  • Schjelderup, Guttorm
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2001

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