Arbeitspapier
Formula Apportionment and Transfer Pricing under Oligopolistic Competition
This paper demonstrates that under conditions of imperfect (oligopolistic) competition, a transition from separate accounting (SA) to formula apportionment (FA) does not eliminate the problem of profit shifting via transfer pricing. In particular, if affiliates of a multinational firm face oligopolistic competition, it is beneficial for the multinational to manipulate transfer prices for tax-saving as well as strategic reasons under both FA and SA. The analysis shows that a switch from SA rules to FA rules may actually strengthen profit shifting activities by multinationals.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 491
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Nielsen, Søren Bo
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2001
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Nielsen, Søren Bo
- Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis
- Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2001