Arbeitspapier

On-the-job training and the effects of insider power

Suppose insiders use their market power to push up their wages, while entrants receive their reservation wages. How will employment be affected? In addressing this question, we focus on the role of on-the-job training. We show that an insider wage hike reduces recession-time employment but, in the presence of on-the-job training, increases boom-time employment. Thus on-the-job training can make insider wage hikes less detrimental to average employment (over booms and recessions). We show that when such training is sufficiently high and when economic shocks are sufficiently transient, an insider wage hike may even lead to a rise in average employment.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IZA Discussion Papers ; No. 586

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Monopsony; Segmented Labor Markets
Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
Employment; Unemployment; Wages; Intergenerational Income Distribution; Aggregate Human Capital; Aggregate Labor Productivity
Labor Demand
Thema
insider power
employment
on-the-job training
Arbeitsmarkttheorie
Insider-Outsider-Modell
Berufsbegleitende Ausbildung
Anspruchslohn
Konjunkturelle Arbeitslosigkeit
Beschäftigungseffekt
Theorie

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Díaz-Vázquez, Pilar
Snower, Dennis J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
(wo)
Bonn
(wann)
2002

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Díaz-Vázquez, Pilar
  • Snower, Dennis J.
  • Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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