Arbeitspapier
Will banks promote trade? Equilibrium selection for the trust game with banks
The Trust Game describes a situation where mutually beneficial trade is endangered by opportunistic exploitation. In the Trust Game with Banks this dilemma can be avoided by banks guaranteeing that sellers will be paid. This outcome is, however, not the only possible solution. Bank interference as an equilibrium outcome can coexist with another equilibrium according to which banks are not used at all. By applying the theory of equilibrium selection it is analysed which of the two competing outcomes should be expected, i.e. whether or not banks can indeed promote trade.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1998,104
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Güth, Werner
Ockenfels, Peter
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
-
1998
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10060751
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Güth, Werner
- Ockenfels, Peter
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Time of origin
- 1998
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