Arbeitspapier

Bank competition and collateral: theory and evidence

We investigate the impact of bank competition on the use of collateral in loan contracts. We develop a theoretical model incorporating information asymmetries in a spatial competition framework where banks choose between screening the borrower and asking for collateral. We show that presence of collateral is more likely when bank competition is low. We then test this prediction empirically on a sample of bank loans from 70 countries. We estimate logit models where the presence of collateral is regressed on bank competition, measured by the Lerner index. Our empirical tests corroborate the theoretical predictions that bank competition reduces the use of collateral. These findings survive several robustness checks.

ISBN
978-952-462-475-6
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 27/2008

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Hainz, Christa
Weill, Laurent
Godlewski, Christophe J.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2008

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:41 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Hainz, Christa
  • Weill, Laurent
  • Godlewski, Christophe J.
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2008

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