Arbeitspapier

Moral hazard in the credit market when the collateral value is stochastic

This theoretical paper explores the effects of costly and non-costly collateral on moral hazard, when collateral value may fluctuate. Given that all collateral is costly, stochastic collateral will entail the same positive incentive effects as nonstochastic collateral, provided the variation in collateral value is modest. If it is large, the incentive effects are smaller under stochastic collateral. With non-costly collateral, stochastic collateral entails positive incentive effects or no effects, if the variation in collateral value is modest. If it is large, the incentive effects may be positive or negative. Thus, collateral can increase moral hazard. The findings are related to the topical subprime crisis and the fluctuating value of real estate collateral.?

Sprache
Englisch
ISBN
978-952-462-648-4

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 22/2010

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2010

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2010

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