Arbeitspapier

Pre-emptive horizontal mergers: theory and evidence

This paper proposes and tests an explanation as to why rational managers seeking to maximize shareholder value can pursue value-decreasing mergers. It can be optimal to overpay for a target firm and decrease shareholder value if the loss is less than in an alternative where the merger is undertaken by a product market rival. This paper presents a model based on synergies, market power and competition for merger targets. Consistent with the model the empirical results obtained here show a strong correlation between the returns of acquiring firms and close rivals around merger events.

ISBN
978-952-462-383-4
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2007

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Thema
acquisitions
auction
event study
oligopoly
preemption

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Molnár, József
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2007

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Molnár, József
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2007

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