Arbeitspapier
Pre-emptive horizontal mergers: theory and evidence
This paper proposes and tests an explanation as to why rational managers seeking to maximize shareholder value can pursue value-decreasing mergers. It can be optimal to overpay for a target firm and decrease shareholder value if the loss is less than in an alternative where the merger is undertaken by a product market rival. This paper presents a model based on synergies, market power and competition for merger targets. Consistent with the model the empirical results obtained here show a strong correlation between the returns of acquiring firms and close rivals around merger events.
- ISBN
-
978-952-462-383-4
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: Bank of Finland Research Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2007
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Voting; Proxy Contests; Corporate Governance
Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Auctions
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
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acquisitions
auction
event study
oligopoly
preemption
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Molnár, József
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Bank of Finland
- (wo)
-
Helsinki
- (wann)
-
2007
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Molnár, József
- Bank of Finland
Entstanden
- 2007