Arbeitspapier

The effects of competition on banks' risk taking with and without deposit insurance

We consider the joint effect of competition and deposit insurance on risk taking by banks when the riskiness of banks is unobservable to depositors.It turns out that the magnitude of risk taking depends on the type of bank competition.If the bank is a monopoly or banks compete only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no effect on risk taking.In that case the banks are too risky but extreme risk taking is avoided.In contrast, introducing deposit insurance increases risk taking if banks compete for deposits. Then, deposit rates become excessively high and force the banks to take extreme risks.Regarding the effects of increasing competition when there is deposit insurance, the results imply that deposit competition encourages risk taking but loan market competition does not.Our results can be extended more generally to insurance guaranty funds.

ISBN
951-686-691-3
Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Bank of Finland Discussion Papers ; No. 21/2000

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Thema
Deposit insurance
Insurance guaranty funds
Bank and insurance regulation
Moral hazard
Credit rationing
Financial Fragility

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Bank of Finland
(wo)
Helsinki
(wann)
2000

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:46 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Niinimäki, Juha-Pekka
  • Bank of Finland

Entstanden

  • 2000

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