Arbeitspapier
Gainers and Losers from Market Integration
We compare integration of economic, matching and networking markets. There can be losers from integration in all three cases, but their relative numbers depend on the type of market. There can be many losers from integration of pure exchange economies. There are relatively few losers from integration of networking markets. In the matching case, the relative numbers tend to lie between those of the other two cases.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 7977
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
Network Formation and Analysis: Theory
- Subject
-
competitive exchange
matching theory
networks
market integration
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Gersbach, Hans
Haller, Hans
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (where)
-
Munich
- (when)
-
2019
- Handle
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Gersbach, Hans
- Haller, Hans
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Time of origin
- 2019
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