Arbeitspapier

The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability

This paper contributes to an agenda that views the effects of policies and institutional reforms as dependent on the structure of political incentives for national and subnational political actors. The paper studies political incentive structures at the subnational level and the mechanisms whereby they affect national-level politics and policymaking at the national level in Argentina, a highly decentralized middle-income democracy, Argentina. The Argentine political system makes subnational political power structures very influential in national politics. Moreover, most Argentine provinces are local bastions of power dominated by entrenched elites, characterized by scarce political competition, weak division of powers, and clientelistic political linkages. Political dominance in the provinces and political importance at the national level reinforce each other, dragging the Argentine political and policymaking system towards the practices and features of its most politically backward regions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: IDB Working Paper Series ; No. IDB-WP-327

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
Structure, Scope, and Performance of Government
State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: General
Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism; Secession

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Ardanaz, Martin
Leiras, Marcelo
Tommasi, Mariano
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
(wo)
Washington, DC
(wann)
2012

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Ardanaz, Martin
  • Leiras, Marcelo
  • Tommasi, Mariano
  • Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

Entstanden

  • 2012

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