Federalism and accountability with distorted election choices

Arbeitspapier

Random factors such as bad weather or exogenous economic shocks affect the re-election of politicians and can reduce accountability. Such distorted election choices interact with the architecture of government. Contrasting centralized with decentralized political systems, this study shows that centralization is likely to result in higher accountability if election choices are subject to small random distortions. Furthermore, equity and efficiency arguments for uniform policies in centralized systems are derived as these are likely to result in the better overall performance of politicians and in more equal performance across regions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2789

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations: Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
• Thema: accountability ; federalism ; decentralization ; retrospective voting ; Condorcet Jury Theorem ; Föderalismus ; Zentralstaat ; Wiederwahl ; Vergleich ; Abstimmungsparadoxon ; Theorie

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Kessing, Sebastian G.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (wo): Munich
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30473
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ