Arbeitspapier
Targeting the wrong teachers? Linking measurement with theory to evaluate teacher incentive schemes
Measurement is crucial to the implementation of output-based incentive schemes. This paper uses models to study the performance of teacher quality estimators that enter teacher incentive schemes. I model an administrator tasked with (i) categorizing teachers with respect to a cutoff, (ii) retaining teachers in a hidden type environment, and (iii) compensating teachers in a hidden action environment. The preferred estimator would be the same in each model and depends on the relationship between teacher quality and class size. I use data from Los Angeles to show that simple fixed effects would almost always outperform more popular empirical Bayes.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: CHCP Working Paper ; No. 2017-1
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Subject
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teacher incentive pay
teacher quality
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Mehta, Nirav
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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The University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP)
- (where)
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London (Ontario)
- (when)
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2017
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Mehta, Nirav
- The University of Western Ontario, Centre for Human Capital and Productivity (CHCP)
Time of origin
- 2017
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