Arbeitspapier
On MQS regulation, innovation and market coverage
We revisit Maxwell's (1998) analysis to show that MQS regulation has no effects on the high-quality firm's incentive to adopt a more efficient technology in a vertically differentiated duopoly with full market coverage and convex costs of quality improvements which are independent of the scale of production.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 575
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Bacchiega, Emanuele
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
2006
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4710
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Bacchiega, Emanuele
- Lambertini, Luca
- Mantovani, Andrea
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 2006
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Full vs Partial Market Coverage with Minimum Quality Standards
Market Coverage and the Existence of Equilibrium in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition
Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly
Process Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly with Labour-Managed Firms
Market integration, the Specialization of Production and Labour Mobility Under Endogenous Differentiation
Innovation and product market concentration: Schumpeter, Arrow and the inverted-U shape curve
On the Regulation of A Vertically Differentiated Market Through Taxation/Subsidization of Product Quality
Growth in a Differentiated Oligopoly with Product Innovation
Process and Product Innovation in a Vertically Differentiated Monopoly
Full vs Partial Market Coverage with Minimum Quality Standards
Market Coverage and the Existence of Equilibrium in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition
Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly
Process Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly with Labour-Managed Firms
Market integration, the Specialization of Production and Labour Mobility Under Endogenous Differentiation
Innovation and product market concentration: Schumpeter, Arrow and the inverted-U shape curve
On the Regulation of A Vertically Differentiated Market Through Taxation/Subsidization of Product Quality
Growth in a Differentiated Oligopoly with Product Innovation
Process and Product Innovation in a Vertically Differentiated Monopoly
Full vs Partial Market Coverage with Minimum Quality Standards
Market Coverage and the Existence of Equilibrium in a Vertically Differentiated Duopoly
Innovation and Managerial Incentives: A Tale of Two Systems
Cartel Stability and the Curvature of Market Demand
Strategic Delegation and the Shape of Market Competition
Product Innovation Under Vertical Differentiation and the Persistence of Monopoly
Process Innovation and the Persistence of Monopoly with Labour-Managed Firms
Market integration, the Specialization of Production and Labour Mobility Under Endogenous Differentiation
Innovation and product market concentration: Schumpeter, Arrow and the inverted-U shape curve
On the Regulation of A Vertically Differentiated Market Through Taxation/Subsidization of Product Quality
Growth in a Differentiated Oligopoly with Product Innovation