Arbeitspapier
Two-period resource duopoly with endogenous intertemporal capacity constraints
This paper analyzes the strategic firm behavior within the context of a two-period resource duopoly model in which firms face endogenous intertemporal capacity constraints. Firms are allowed to invest in capacity in between two periods in order to increase their initial endowment of exhaustible resource stocks. Using this setup, we find that the equilibrium price weakly decreases over time. Moreover, asymmetric distribution of initial resource stocks leads to a significant change in equilibrium outcome, provided that firms do not have the same cost structure in capacity additions. It is also verified that if only one company is capable of investment in capacity, the market moves to a more concentrated structure in the second period.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: EWI Working Paper ; No. 14/13
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development
- Thema
-
Dynamic Duopoly
Cournot Competition
Endogenous Intertemporal Capacity Constraints
Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Berk, Istemi
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne (EWI)
- (wo)
-
Köln
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Berk, Istemi
- Institute of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne (EWI)
Entstanden
- 2014
Ähnliche Objekte (12)
Endogenous choice of capacity and product innovation in a differential duopoly
Duopoly price competition with limited capacity
Duopoly price competition with limited capacity
Advertising and Endogenous Exit in a Differentiated Duopoly
Capacity choice and duopoly incentives for information sharing
Endogenous Attention Costs and Intertemporal Decision-Making
Capacity Accumulation and Utilization in a Differential Duopoly Game
Price vs Quantity in a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Capacity Accumulation
Can capacity constraints explain asymmetries
To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets
Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
Endogenous choice of capacity and product innovation in a differential duopoly
Duopoly price competition with limited capacity
Duopoly price competition with limited capacity
Advertising and Endogenous Exit in a Differentiated Duopoly
Capacity choice and duopoly incentives for information sharing
Endogenous Attention Costs and Intertemporal Decision-Making
Capacity Accumulation and Utilization in a Differential Duopoly Game
Price vs Quantity in a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Capacity Accumulation
Can capacity constraints explain asymmetries
To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets
Endogenous timing and the choice of quality in a vertically differentiated duopoly
Endogenous choice of capacity and product innovation in a differential duopoly
Duopoly price competition with limited capacity
Duopoly price competition with limited capacity
Advertising and Endogenous Exit in a Differentiated Duopoly
Capacity choice and duopoly incentives for information sharing
Endogenous Attention Costs and Intertemporal Decision-Making
Capacity Accumulation and Utilization in a Differential Duopoly Game
Price vs Quantity in a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Capacity Accumulation
Can capacity constraints explain asymmetries
To commit or not to commit: Endogenous timing in experimental duopoly markets
Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets