Arbeitspapier

Advertising and Endogenous Exit in a Differentiated Duopoly

In this paper we consider a duopoly two-stage duopoly where firms first decide whether to invest in advertising and then compete in prices. Advertising has two effects: a market enlargement for both firms and a predatory gain for the investing firm only. Both symmetric and asymmetric equilibria may arise. The two most interesting cases are a coordination game where both firms investing and non-investing are equilibria, and a chicken game where only one firm invests while the other is possibly driven (endogenously) out of the market. Our results suggest that product differentiation has an ambiguous impact on investment in advertising and that strong product substitutability may induce a coordination problem.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 455

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Mantovani, Andrea
Mion, Giordano
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
(wo)
Bologna
(wann)
2002

DOI
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4840
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Mantovani, Andrea
  • Mion, Giordano
  • Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)

Entstanden

  • 2002

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