Arbeitspapier
Endogenous choice of capacity and product innovation in a differential duopoly
We model a symmetric duopoly where firms choose whether to be quantity setters or price setters by deciding the optimal capacity; undertake R&D activity to determine the degree of differentiation; and finally compete in the market. Two games are proposed, where investment decisions follow different sequences. We assess price and quantity decisions, finding a set of equilibria where the choice of the market variable is affected by both technological commitments. As a result, the acquired wisdom that quantity setting is a dominant strategy for firms, while price setting is a dominant strategy from a social standpoint, may not be confirmed.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Quaderni - Working Paper DSE ; No. 320
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Lambertini, Luca
Rossini, Giampaolo
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
- (wo)
-
Bologna
- (wann)
-
1998
- DOI
-
doi:10.6092/unibo/amsacta/4988
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
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ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Lambertini, Luca
- Rossini, Giampaolo
- Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE)
Entstanden
- 1998
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