Arbeitspapier

Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter?

This paper exploits a 2018 reform of teachers' financial incentives to work in some French disadvantaged schools. Based on this quasi-natural experiment, it evaluates the impact of those incentives on teachers' stated preferences to move to such schools. Using data from the internal human resource management of some educational authority, we find that most responsive teachers have less experience and work already in those areas. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the policy has not hurt other disadvantaged schools, but rather induced some teachers not to remain in their current school or to opt less for regular schools.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9906

Classification
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Education
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Public Sector Labor Markets
Subject
teacher mobility
financial incentives
stated preferences
rank-ordered choices
disadvantaged schools

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Silhol, Julien
Wilner, Lionel
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2022

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Silhol, Julien
  • Wilner, Lionel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2022

Other Objects (12)