Arbeitspapier

Teachers' Desired Mobility to Disadvantaged Schools: Do Financial Incentives Matter?

This paper exploits a 2018 reform of teachers' financial incentives to work in some French disadvantaged schools. Based on this quasi-natural experiment, it evaluates the impact of those incentives on teachers' stated preferences to move to such schools. Using data from the internal human resource management of some educational authority, we find that most responsive teachers have less experience and work already in those areas. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the policy has not hurt other disadvantaged schools, but rather induced some teachers not to remain in their current school or to opt less for regular schools.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 9906

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Analysis of Education
Educational Finance; Financial Aid
Public Sector Labor Markets
Thema
teacher mobility
financial incentives
stated preferences
rank-ordered choices
disadvantaged schools

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Silhol, Julien
Wilner, Lionel
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2022

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Silhol, Julien
  • Wilner, Lionel
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2022

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