Investor-state vs. state-state dispute settlement

Arbeitspapier

International investment agreements have provoked intense criticism in the policy debate during recent years. Particularly contentious has been their "ISDS" mechanisms, which enable investors to litigate against host countries. This paper examines whether host countries would be better off with state-state dispute settlement (SSDS), as often alleged, assuming that SSDS cause political/diplomatic litigation costs that are not present with ISDS. Two separate reasons why host countries might benefit from SSDS are identified, but neither provides a convincing argument for host countries to move to SSDS. The paper concludes that host countries should reduce the stringency of their agreements, rather than introduce imperfections in the dispute settlement systems to reduce their bite.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: IFN Working Paper ; No. 1248

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; International Investment; Long-term Capital Movements ; Multinational Firms; International Business ; International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations ; International Law
• Thema: ISDS ; Expropriation ; International investment agreements ; Regulatory chill

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Horn, Henrik
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN)
• (wo): Stockholm
• (wann): 2018

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/210889
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ