Investor‐state dispute settlement and multinational firm behavior

Artikel

This paper shows that investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) make multinational firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Journal: Review of International Economics ; ISSN: 1467-9396 ; Volume: 29 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1013-1024 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Schjelderup, Guttorm ; Stähler, Frank
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Wiley
• (where): Hoboken, NJ
• (when): 2021

Further information

• DOI: doi:10.1111/roie.12532
• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/242005
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:43 AM CET