Artikel
Investor‐state dispute settlement and multinational firm behavior
This paper shows that investor-state dispute settlements (ISDS) make multinational firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently, potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Journal: Review of International Economics ; ISSN: 1467-9396 ; Volume: 29 ; Year: 2021 ; Issue: 4 ; Pages: 1013-1024 ; Hoboken, NJ: Wiley
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
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Schjelderup, Guttorm
Stähler, Frank
- Ereignis
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Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Wiley
- (wo)
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Hoboken, NJ
- (wann)
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2021
- DOI
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doi:10.1111/roie.12532
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Artikel
Beteiligte
- Schjelderup, Guttorm
- Stähler, Frank
- Wiley
Entstanden
- 2021