Arbeitspapier
Fair allocation of disputed properties
We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market-based allocation rules that impose a two-step procedure: assignment of rights based on claims first, and voluntary exchange based on the assigned rights afterwards. We characterize three focal egalitarian rights-assignment rules that guarantee that the allocation rules are fair. We apply our results to problems of greenhouse gas emissions and contested water rights.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2016-10
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
- Thema
-
fairness
claims
no-envy
individual rationality
egalitarianism
efficiency
Walrasian exchange
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Ju, Biung-Ghi
Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
- (wo)
-
Amherst, MA
- (wann)
-
2016
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Ju, Biung-Ghi
- Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
- University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
Entstanden
- 2016
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