Arbeitspapier

Fair allocation of disputed properties

We model problems of allocating disputed properties as generalized exchange economies. Therein, agents have preferences and claims over multiple goods, and the social endowment of each good may not be sufficient to satisfy all individual claims. We focus on market-based allocation rules that impose a two-step procedure: assignment of rights based on claims first, and voluntary exchange based on the assigned rights afterwards. We characterize three focal egalitarian rights-assignment rules that guarantee that the allocation rules are fair. We apply our results to problems of greenhouse gas emissions and contested water rights.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Working Paper ; No. 2016-10

Classification
Wirtschaft
Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Subject
fairness
claims
no-envy
individual rationality
egalitarianism
efficiency
Walrasian exchange

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Ju, Biung-Ghi
Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics
(where)
Amherst, MA
(when)
2016

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Ju, Biung-Ghi
  • Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.
  • University of Massachusetts, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2016

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