Arbeitspapier
Efficient Compensation for Employees? Inventions.
We analyze the legal reform concerning employees? inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new law concerning university employees and the pending reform proposal concerning other employees also fail to implement first-best incentives. With suboptimal incentives to spend effort on inventions, the government?s goal, an increase in the number of patents, is likely to be missed. (88 words)
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: CSLE Discussion Paper ; No. 2003-03
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Contract Law
Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Noncooperative Games
- Thema
-
Moral hazard
hold-up
efficient fixed wage
Vorschlagswesen
Patentrecht
Vergütungssystem
Agency Theory
Theorie
Deutschland
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Kirstein, Roland
Will, Birgit E.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
- (wo)
-
Saarbrücken
- (wann)
-
2003
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Kirstein, Roland
- Will, Birgit E.
- Universität des Saarlandes, Center for the Study of Law and Economics (CSLE)
Entstanden
- 2003
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