Arbeitspapier

What drives fraud in a credence goods market? Evidence from a field study

This paper investigates the impact of four key economic variables on an expert firm’s incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market: the level of competition, the expert firm’s financial situation, its competence, and its reputational concerns. We use and complement the dataset of a nationwide field study conducted by the German Automobile Association that regularly checks the reliability of garages in Germany. We find that more intense competition and high competence lower firms’ incentive to overcharge. A low concern for reputation and a critical financial situation increase the incentive to overcharge.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Economics Working Paper Series ; No. 13/179

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility
Thema
Asymmetric information
Auto repair market
Credence goods
Expert
Fraud
Overcharging
Kfz-Gewerbe
Instandhaltung
Betrug
Anreiz
Firmenimage
Wettbewerb
Vertrauensgüter
Deutschland

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Rasch, Alexander
Waibel, Christian
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research
(wo)
Zurich
(wann)
2013

DOI
doi:10.3929/ethz-a-009768078
Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Rasch, Alexander
  • Waibel, Christian
  • ETH Zurich, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research

Entstanden

  • 2013

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