Arbeitspapier

What drives fraud in a credence goods market? Evidence from a field study

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This paper investigates the impact of four key economic variables on an expert firm's incentive to defraud its customers in a credence goods market: the level of competition, the expert firm's financial situation, its competence, and its reputational concerns. We use and complement the dataset of a nationwide field study conducted by the German Automobile Association that regularly checks the reliability of garages in Germany. We find that more intense competition and high competence lower a firm's incentive to overcharge. A low concern for reputation and a critical financial situation increase the incentive to overcharge.

ISBN: 978-3-86304-179-3

Language: Englisch

Bibliographic citation: Series: DICE Discussion Paper ; No. 180

Classification: Wirtschaft
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Information and Product Quality; Standardization and Compatibility

Subject: Asymmetric information
Auto repair market
Credence goods
Expert
Fraud
Overcharging

Event: Geistige Schöpfung

(who): Rasch, Alexander
Waibel, Christian

Event: Veröffentlichung

(who): Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

(where): Düsseldorf

(when): 2015

Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/109212

Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

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Object type

Arbeitspapier

Associated

Rasch, Alexander
Waibel, Christian
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Time of origin

2015

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