Arbeitspapier

What drives taxi drivers? A field experiment on fraud in a market for credence goods

Credence goods are characterized by informational asymmetries between sellers and consumers that invite fraudulent behavior by sellers. This paper presents the results of a natural field experiment on taxi rides in Athens, Greece, set up to measure different types of fraud and to examine the influence of passengers' presumed information and income on the extent of fraud. Results reveal that taxi drivers cheat passengers in systematic ways: Passengers with inferior information about optimal routes are taken on longer detours while asymmetric information on the local tariff system leads to manipulated bills. Higher income seems to lead to more fraud.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 3461

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft
Field Experiments
Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Thema
credence goods
expert services
natural field experiment
taxi rides
fraud
asymmetric information
Taxigewerbe
Betrug
Vertrauensgüter
Asymmetrische Information
Feldforschung
Athen

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Balafoutas, Loukas
Beck, Adrian
Kerschbamer, Rudolf
Sutter, Matthias
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(wo)
Munich
(wann)
2011

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ

Datenpartner

Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.

Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Balafoutas, Loukas
  • Beck, Adrian
  • Kerschbamer, Rudolf
  • Sutter, Matthias
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Entstanden

  • 2011

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