An experimental investigation of colonel blotto games

Arbeitspapier

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a guerilla warfare” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 2688

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Subject: Colonel Blotto ; conflict resolution ; contest theory ; multi-dimensional resource allocation ; rent-seeking ; experiments ; Nichtkooperatives Spiel ; Konflikt ; Potenzieller Wettbewerb ; Allokation ; Rent Seeking ; Test

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Chowdhury, Subhasish M. ; Kovenock, Dan ; Sheremeta, Roman M.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
• (where): Munich
• (when): 2009

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/30457
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET