An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games

Arbeitspapier

This article examines behavior in the two-player, constant-sum Colonel Blotto game with asymmetric resources in which players maximize the expected number of battlefields won. The experimental results support all major theoretical predictions. In the auction treatment, where winning a battlefield is deterministic, disadvantaged players use a “guerilla warfare” strategy which stochastically allocates zero resources to a subset of battlefields. Advantaged players employ a “stochastic complete coverage” strategy, allocating random, but positive, resource levels across the battlefields. In the lottery treatment, where winning a battlefield is probabilistic, both players divide their resources equally across all battlefields.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Weitere Titel: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung von „Colonel Blotto“-Spielen
• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: WZB Discussion Paper ; No. SP II 2009-08

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior ; Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
• Thema: Colonel Blotto ; conflict resolution ; contest theory ; multi-dimensional ; resource allocation ; rent-seeking ; experiments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Chowdhury, Subhasish M. ; Kovenock, Dan ; Sheremeta, Roman M.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
• (wo): Berlin
• (wann): 2009

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/51103
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ