Arbeitspapier

Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces

The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for the stability of rest points. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1998,68

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
Subject
replicator dynamics
evolutionary stability
continuous strategy spaces
oligopoly

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Oechssler, Jörg
Riedel, Frank
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(where)
Berlin
(when)
1998

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10060102
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Oechssler, Jörg
  • Riedel, Frank
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Time of origin

  • 1998

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