Arbeitspapier
Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this restriction is in most cases unnecessary. We give a mild condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for infinite strategy spaces. Furthermore, we provide conditions for the stability of rest points. Finally, we apply this general theory to a number of applications like the Nash demand game, the War of Attrition, Cournot and Bertrand oligopoly games, and mixed strategies.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 1998,68
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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replicator dynamics
evolutionary stability
continuous strategy spaces
oligopoly
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Oechssler, Jörg
Riedel, Frank
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (where)
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Berlin
- (when)
-
1998
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10060102
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Oechssler, Jörg
- Riedel, Frank
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Time of origin
- 1998