Arbeitspapier

On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models

We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,73

Classification
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
Subject
replicator dynamics
evolutionary stability
ESS
CSS

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Oechssler, Jörg
Riedel, Frank
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
(where)
Berlin
(when)
2000

Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047994
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET

Data provider

This object is provided by:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.

Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Oechssler, Jörg
  • Riedel, Frank
  • Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes

Time of origin

  • 2000

Other Objects (12)