Arbeitspapier
On the dynamic foundation of evolutionary stability in continuous models
We show in this paper that none of the existing static evolutionary stability concepts (ESS, CSS, uninvadability, NIS) is sufficient to guarantee dynamic stability in the weak topology with respect to standard evolutionary dynamics if the strategy space is continuous. We propose a new concept, evolutionary robustness, which is stronger than the previous concepts. Evolutionary robustness ensures dynamic stability for replicator dynamics in doubly symmetric games.
- Language
-
Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
-
Series: SFB 373 Discussion Paper ; No. 2000,73
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Noncooperative Games
- Subject
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replicator dynamics
evolutionary stability
ESS
CSS
- Event
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
-
Oechssler, Jörg
Riedel, Frank
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (who)
-
Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
- (where)
-
Berlin
- (when)
-
2000
- Handle
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:kobv:11-10047994
- Last update
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET
Data provider
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Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Oechssler, Jörg
- Riedel, Frank
- Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes
Time of origin
- 2000