Arbeitspapier

On the Persistence of Strategic Sophistication

We examine whether the Level-k' model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of games does not predict their ranking in the other. Direct tests of strategic reasoning generally do not predict estimated levels. Within families of games, we find that levels are fairly consistent within one family, but not the other. Our results suggest that the use of Level-k reasoning varies by game, making prediction difficult.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4653

Classification
Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Subject
Level-k
cognitive hierarchy
behavioral game theory

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Georganas, Sotiris
Healy, Paul J.
Weber, Roberto A.
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
(where)
Munich
(when)
2014

Handle
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:42 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Georganas, Sotiris
  • Healy, Paul J.
  • Weber, Roberto A.
  • Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)

Time of origin

  • 2014

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