Arbeitspapier
Strategic forecasting on the FOMC
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve consists of voting- and non-voting members. Apart from deciding about interest rate policy, members individually formulate regular inflation forecasts. This paper uncovers systematic differences in individual inflation forecasts submitted by voting and non-voting members. Based on a data set with individual forecasts recently made available it is shown that non-voters systematically overpredict inflation relative to the consensus forecast if they favor tighter policy and underpredict inflation if the favor looser policy. These findings are consistent with non-voting member following strategic motives in forecasting, i.e. non-voting members use their forecast to influence policy deliberation.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: MAGKS Joint Discussion Paper Series in Economics ; No. 17-2010
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
Monetary Policy
- Thema
-
inflation forecast
forecast errors
monetary policy
monetary committee
Federal Reserve
Geldpolitik
Gruppenentscheidung
Inflation
Prognose
Manipulation
USA
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Tillmann, Peter
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
- (wo)
-
Marburg
- (wann)
-
2010
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ
Datenpartner
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Tillmann, Peter
- Philipps-University Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics
Entstanden
- 2010
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