Arbeitspapier
On the Persistence of Strategic Sophistication
We examine whether the Level-k' model of strategic behavior generates reliable cross-game predictions within an individual. We find no correlation in subjects' estimated levels of reasoning across two families of games. Furthermore, estimating a higher level for Ann than Bob in one family of games does not predict their ranking in the other. Direct tests of strategic reasoning generally do not predict estimated levels. Within families of games, we find that levels are fairly consistent within one family, but not the other. Our results suggest that the use of Level-k reasoning varies by game, making prediction difficult.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: CESifo Working Paper ; No. 4653
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
- Thema
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Level-k
cognitive hierarchy
behavioral game theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Georganas, Sotiris
Healy, Paul J.
Weber, Roberto A.
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
- (wo)
-
Munich
- (wann)
-
2014
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Georganas, Sotiris
- Healy, Paul J.
- Weber, Roberto A.
- Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Entstanden
- 2014