Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model

Arbeitspapier

In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b)bargaining model. It turns out that 'cleverness' in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 507

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
• Subject: Evolution ; Bargaining ; Bounded rationality ; Game theory

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Weibull, Jörgen W. ; Saez-Marti, Maria
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
• (where): Stockholm
• (when): 1998

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95001
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET