Arbeitspapier
Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model
In the models of Young (1993a,b), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (1993b)bargaining model. It turns out that 'cleverness' in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: IUI Working Paper ; No. 507
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- Thema
-
Evolution
Bargaining
Bounded rationality
Game theory
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Saez-Marti, Maria
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
- (wo)
-
Stockholm
- (wann)
-
1998
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ
Datenpartner
Dieses Objekt wird bereitgestellt von:
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. Bei Fragen zum Objekt wenden Sie sich bitte an den Datenpartner.
Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Weibull, Jörgen W.
- Saez-Marti, Maria
- The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI)
Entstanden
- 1998
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