Arbeitspapier
Clever agents in adaptive learning
Saez-Marti and Weibull [4] investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's [8] bargaining model. This is how they introduce cleverness of players. We analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games. We show that Young's [9] prediction is robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategies distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents.
- Sprache
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Englisch
- Erschienen in
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Series: SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance ; No. 403
- Klassifikation
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Wirtschaft
Noncooperative Games
Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
- Thema
-
Evolution
game theory
bounded rationality
Markov chain
stochastic stability
- Ereignis
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
Matros, Alexander
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
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Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
- (wo)
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Stockholm
- (wann)
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2000
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
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20.09.2024, 08:23 MESZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- Matros, Alexander
- Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI)
Entstanden
- 2000