Arbeitspapier
Nonrenewable Resources, Strategic Behavior and the Hotelling Rule: An Experiment
This study uses the methods of experimental economics to investigate possible causes for the failure of the Hotelling rule for nonrenewable resources. We argue that as long as resource stocks are high enough, producers may choose to (partially) ignore the dynamic component of their production decision, shifting production to the present and focusing more on strategic behavior. We experimentally vary stock size in a nonrenewable resource duopoly setting and find that producers with high stocks indeed pay significantly less attention to variables related to dynamic optimization, leading to a failure of the Hotelling rule.
- Sprache
-
Englisch
- Erschienen in
-
Series: Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper ; No. 11-014/1
- Klassifikation
-
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: General
Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation: Demand and Supply; Prices
Energy: Demand and Supply; Prices
Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- Thema
-
Experiments
Nonrenewable Resources
Dynamic Oligopoly
Erschöpfbare Ressourcen
Oligopol
Hotelling-Regel
Experimentelle Ökonomik
Theorie
- Ereignis
-
Geistige Schöpfung
- (wer)
-
van Veldhuizen, Roel
Sonnemans, Joep
- Ereignis
-
Veröffentlichung
- (wer)
-
Tinbergen Institute
- (wo)
-
Amsterdam and Rotterdam
- (wann)
-
2011
- Handle
- Letzte Aktualisierung
-
10.03.2025, 11:42 MEZ
Datenpartner
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Objekttyp
- Arbeitspapier
Beteiligte
- van Veldhuizen, Roel
- Sonnemans, Joep
- Tinbergen Institute
Entstanden
- 2011