Arbeitspapier

Savage vs. Anscombe-Aumann: An experimental investigation of ambiguity frameworks

The Savage and the Anscombe-Aumann frameworks are the two most popular approaches used when modeling ambiguity. The former is more flexible, but the latter is often preferred for its simplicity. We conduct an experiment where subjects place bets on the joint outcome of an ambiguous urn and a fair coin. We document that more than a third of our subjects make choices that are incompatible with Anscombe-Aumann for any preferences, while the Savage framework is flexible enough to accountfor subjects' behaviors.

Language
Englisch

Bibliographic citation
Series: Discussion Paper Series ; No. 672

Classification
Wirtschaft
Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual
Noncooperative Games
Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
Subject
Ellsberg paradox
ambiguity
experiment

Event
Geistige Schöpfung
(who)
Oechssler, Jörg
Roomets, Alex
Event
Veröffentlichung
(who)
University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics
(where)
Heidelberg
(when)
2019

DOI
doi:10.11588/heidok.00027276
Handle
URN
urn:nbn:de:bsz:16-heidok-272764
Last update
10.03.2025, 11:41 AM CET

Data provider

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Object type

  • Arbeitspapier

Associated

  • Oechssler, Jörg
  • Roomets, Alex
  • University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics

Time of origin

  • 2019

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