Granny versus Game Theorst: Ambiguity in Experimental Games

Arbeitspapier

We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2006

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Design of Experiments: General
• Thema: Knightian uncertainty ; Choquet expected utility ; equilibrium under ambiguity ; strategic uncertainty ; experiments

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Eichberger, Jürgen ; Kelsey, David H. ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (wo): Bonn
• (wann): 2006

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22962
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ