Granny versus Game Theorst: Ambiguity in Experimental Games

Arbeitspapier

We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or other subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Bonn Econ Discussion Papers ; No. 17/2006

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty: General ; Design of Experiments: Laboratory, Individual ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General ; Design of Experiments: General
• Subject: Knightian uncertainty ; Choquet expected utility ; equilibrium under ambiguity ; strategic uncertainty ; experiments

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Eichberger, Jürgen ; Kelsey, David H. ; Schipper, Burkhard C.
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): University of Bonn, Bonn Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
• (where): Bonn
• (when): 2006

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22962
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET