Arbeitspapier
Incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players
We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality each player's strategy is optimal at each information set given opponents' strategies. We show sequential optimality, which does not make any explicit assumption on updating, is equivalent to sequential optimality with respect to beliefs updated using a particular generalization of Bayesian updating. Ambiguity aversion expands the set of equilibria compatible with players sharing common ambiguous beliefs. We connect ambiguity aversion with belief robustness. Examples illustrate new strategic behavior, including strategic use of ambiguity, under ambiguity aversion.
- Language
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Englisch
- Bibliographic citation
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Series: Working Paper ; No. 868
- Classification
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Wirtschaft
- Event
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Geistige Schöpfung
- (who)
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Hanany, Eran
Klibanoff, Peter
Mukerji, Sujoy
- Event
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Veröffentlichung
- (who)
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Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
- (where)
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London
- (when)
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2018
- Handle
- Last update
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10.03.2025, 11:44 AM CET
Data provider
ZBW - Deutsche Zentralbibliothek für Wirtschaftswissenschaften - Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Object type
- Arbeitspapier
Associated
- Hanany, Eran
- Klibanoff, Peter
- Mukerji, Sujoy
- Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Time of origin
- 2018
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