Arbeitspapier

Granny versus game theorist: ambiguity in experimental games

We report on an experiment in which subjects choose actions in strategic games with either strategic complements or substitutes against a granny, a game theorist or ther subjects. The games are selected in order to test predictions on the comparative statics of equilibrium with respect to changes in strategic ambiguity. We find that subjects face higher ambiguity while playing against the granny than playing against the game theorist if we assume that subjects are ambiguity averse. Moreover, under the same assumption, subjects choose more secure actions in games more prone to ambiguity which is in line with the predictions.

Sprache
Englisch

Erschienen in
Series: Working Paper ; No. 06-27

Klassifikation
Wirtschaft

Ereignis
Geistige Schöpfung
(wer)
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Eichberger, Jürgen
Kelsey, David H.
Ereignis
Veröffentlichung
(wer)
University of California, Department of Economics
(wo)
Davis, CA
(wann)
2006

Handle
Letzte Aktualisierung
10.03.2025, 11:43 MEZ

Datenpartner

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Objekttyp

  • Arbeitspapier

Beteiligte

  • Schipper, Burkhard C.
  • Eichberger, Jürgen
  • Kelsey, David H.
  • University of California, Department of Economics

Entstanden

  • 2006

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