- Location
-
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek Frankfurt am Main
- Extent
-
Online-Ressource
- Language
-
Deutsch
- Bibliographic citation
-
IZA Discussion Papers ; 5323
- Classification
-
Wirtschaft
- Keyword
-
Vertragstheorie
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Noise Trading
Pareto-Optimum
Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie
Kontrakttheorie
Entscheidung bei Unsicherheit
Entscheidungsregel
Noise trading
Pareto-Optimum
LEN-Modell
- Event
-
Veröffentlichung
- (where)
-
Bonn
- (who)
-
Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
- (when)
-
2010
- Creator
- URN
-
urn:nbn:de:101:1-201103223333
- Rights
-
Der Zugriff auf das Objekt ist unbeschränkt möglich.
- Last update
-
25.03.2025, 1:41 PM CET
Data provider
This object is provided by:
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Deutsche Nationalbibliothek. If you have any questions about the object, please contact the data provider.
Associated
- Prat, Julien
- Jovanovic, Boyan
- Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH
Time of origin
- 2010
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