Social Conformity in Games with Many Players

Arbeitspapier

In the literature of psychology and economics it is frequently observed that individuals tend to imitate similar individuals. A fundamental question is whether the outcome of such imitation can be consistent with self-interested behaviour. We propose that this consistency requires the existence of a Nash equilibrium that induces a partition of the player set into relatively few groups of similar individuals playing the same or similar strategies. In this paper we define and characterise a family of games admitting existence of approximated Nash equilibria in pure strategies that induce partition of the player sets with the desired properties. We also introduce the Conley-Wooders concept of 'crowding types' into our description players and distinguish between the crowding type of a player - those characteristics of a player that have direct effects on others - and his tastes, taken to directly affect only that player. With this assumption of 'within crowding type anonymity' and a 'convexity of taste-types' assumption we show that the number of groups can be uniformly bounded.

Object Details

• Language: Englisch

References and Relationships

• Bibliographic citation: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 121.2003

Classification and Topics

• Classification: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
• Subject: Social Conformity ; Nash Equilibrium ; Spieltheorie ; Lernprozess ; Rationalität

Contributors, Places and Time

• Event: Geistige Schöpfung
• (who): Wooders, Myrna ; Cartwright, Edward ; Selten, Reinhard
• Event: Veröffentlichung
• (who): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (where): Milano
• (when): 2003

Further information

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118147
• Last update: 10.03.2025, 11:45 AM CET