Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

Arbeitspapier

Interpret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterised how large e must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where can be chosen to be small.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: Nota di Lavoro ; No. 123.2003

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: General
• Thema: Conformity ; Bounded Rationality ; Spieltheorie ; Begrenzte Rationalität ; Bayes-Statistik ; Nash-Gleichgewicht

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Cartwright, Edward ; Wooders, Myrna
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
• (wo): Milano
• (wann): 2003

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/118150
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:45 MEZ