Sequencing bilateral negotiations with externalities

Arbeitspapier

We show that financial advisors recommend more costly products to female clients, based on minutes from about 27,000 real-world advisory meetings and client portfolio data. Funds recommended to women have higher expense ratios controlling for risk, and women less often receive rebates on upfront fees for any given fund. We develop a model relating these findings to client stereotyping, and empirically verify an additional prediction: Women (but not men) with higher financial aptitude reject recommendations more frequently. Women state a preference for delegating financial decisions, but appear unaware of associated higher costs. Evidence of stereotyping is stronger for male advisors.

Angaben zum Objekt

• Sprache: Englisch

Verweise und Beziehungen

• Erschienen in: Series: ECONtribute Discussion Paper ; No. 096

Klassifikation und Themen

• Klassifikation: Wirtschaft ; Noncooperative Games ; Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; Externalities ; Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks
• Thema: bargaining power ; sequential negotiations ; externalities ; bilateral contracting ; endogenous timing

Beteiligte, Orts- und Zeitangaben

• Ereignis: Geistige Schöpfung
• (wer): Münster, Johannes ; Reisinger, Markus
• Ereignis: Veröffentlichung
• (wer): University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Reinhard Selten Institute (RSI)
• (wo): Bonn and Cologne
• (wann): 2021

Weitere Informationen

• Handle: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/237341
• Letzte Aktualisierung: 10.03.2025, 11:44 MEZ